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“States should not dismiss the possibilities for creative initiatives at the
international level, even if this does go against conventional wisdom.”
—Robert C. Shinn and Matt Polsky, New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection1
Abstract:
What powers do the several states of the United States have individually
to enter into environmental agreements with other sovereign nations?  In
this article, the author reviews the powers that states may have generally
and then specifically regarding environmental agreements.  Several tradi-
tional tools of analysis have historically been used including the constitu-
tional doctrine of pre-emption, cooperative federalism and the foreign
affairs doctrine.  Some newer tools of analysis are also offered including
the revival of the treaty-compact and the author’s own concept of “de-
emption.”  The United States Senate’s explicit refusal to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol, coupled with the consequent state initiatives to control green-
house gases—especially the documents concluded between New Jersey
and the Netherlands, provide rich examples of these tools in contempo-
rary action.
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Introduction—A Brief Review of Conventional Wisdom on State Treaty
Powers
As conventional wisdom would have it, the several states of the United States
of America have agreed that in constituting the sovereign United States, the sev-
eral states would refrain from individually entering into treaties with foreign na-
tions.  Treaty power is a federal power.  Article II, sec. 2 (2) of the United States’
Constitution confers the treaty power on the President and the Senate,2 and Arti-
cle I, sec. 10 (1) prohibits states from “entering into any Treaty, Alliance or
Confederation.”3  At first blush, one might conclude that this statement of the law
is clear and exclusive, but the history of unchallenged state actions, as well as
American court decisions in challenged state actions, have shown otherwise.4
The states and the courts in these actions and decisions have noted that neither
Article I nor Article II declares that states have no foreign relations role to play,
nor that they have no power to do so, as Edward T. Swaine and David R. Hodas
have thoroughly catalogued this.5  In reflection of this, recent years’ scholarship
has witnessed a progression from reviews of federalism and states’ rights gener-
ally regarding treaty-making powers6 to those specifically regarding such issues
as state procurement7 and environmental agreements with foreign powers.8  The
various types of agreements entered into by the several states with foreign coun-
tries has been most thoroughly catalogued by Edward T. Swaine.9  Swaine’s
work covers a diverse and extensive range of areas but only touches lightly upon
the natural environment.  David R. Hodas extends the catalogue more recently to
include the natural environment.10  The recent interest in environmental agree-
ments has blossomed largely, but not exclusively, in response to the United
States Senate’s explicit refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.11  The Senate and the
Bush Administration have taken the position that the environmental benefits to
be gained from the Kyoto Protocol do not outweigh the economic advantages for
the United States to remain outside of its requirements.12
Swaine reminds us that although the United States Constitution prohibits states
from entering into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, states may, with the
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
4 Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49
DUKE L.J. 1127 (2000) [hereinafter Swaine, Negotiating Federalism].
5 Id. (providing a thorough catalogue of these decisions); Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Con-
strain the Treaty Power? 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003) [hereinafter Swaine, Does Federalism]; David
R. Hodas, State Law Responses to Global Warming: Is It Constitutional to Think Globally and Act
Locally? 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 53, 81 (2003).
6 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 5; Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 6.
7 Robert J. Delahunty, Federalism beyond the Water’s Edge: State Procurement Sanctions and For-
eign Affairs, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001).
8 Hodas, supra note 6.
9 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 4.
10 Hodas, supra note 6.
11 S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 143 CONG. REC. 8113 (enacted).
12 Id.
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permission of Congress, enter into an “Agreement or Compact” with a foreign
government.13  If we rely upon the intentions of the Constitutional authors (usu-
ally known by the phrase “framers’ intent”), the distinction between the permissi-
ble agreement, compact, the prohibited treaty, alliance, or confederation may be
impossible to determine due to a lack of documentation in the records from the
Constitutional Convention.14  Recent sources assume that states may enter into
foreign compacts prior to seeking consent from Congress, and may even con-
clude binding agreements without ever obtaining federal approval.15  Louis Hen-
kin punctuates this point when he notes that “no agreement between a state and a
foreign power has been successfully challenged on the ground that it is a treaty
which the state was forbidden to make.”16  Furthermore, “not only does interna-
tional law require federal states to interpret their constitutions so as to permit
adhering to treaties, but the new federalism doctrines show a sensitivity toward
preserving adequate means to pursue national and international ends like the
treaty power, especially where those means turn on state consent.”17
In the following article, I briefly review and combine the work of Swaine and
Hodas, and discuss the recent groundswell of states’ agreements with foreign
countries.  In addition to the interpretations that are largely presented in cases,
Swaine and Hodas have each offered new ideas on pre-emption and the dormant
treaty power, and I now add a new principle with which to analyze co-operative
federalism that I call “de-emption.”18
Tools of States’ Treaty Powers Analysis: Conventional Tools
1. Cooperative Federalism and States’ Rights
Federal-state relations in the regulation of the environment have been as much
a product of politics as of law and have generally yielded a functional, rather than
a precisely legal working relationship known as “cooperative federalism.”  Coop-
erative federalism in environmental regulation is a term used to describe the po-
litical co-operation necessary between the federal government and state
governments to execute the mandate of federal environmental statutes and regu-
lations by state enforcement agencies through federal and state statutes and regu-
13 U.S. CONST. art. I § 10, cl. 3.
14 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 5, at 1194, citing United States Steel Corp. v. Multis-
tate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 459-63 & n.12: “The records of the Constitutional Convention. . . are
barren of any clue as to the precise contours of the agreements and compacts governed by the Compact
Clause.”).  This provides a good example of why intentionality is dismissed as a mode of interpretation
by philosophers and psychologists, and why an author’s intent is not privileged by literary experts. See
Kirk W. Junker, Reading Attitude in the Constitutional Wish, S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. (forthcoming
Winter, 2005).
15 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 5, at n.337.
16 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996).
17 Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 5, at 403.
18 Regarding the need and appropriate use of neologisms see Kirk W. Junker, De-diction, 34 FU-
TURES 895 (2002).
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lations.19  In areas where state programs cover the full range of necessary laws,
with an enforcement regime as strict as or stricter than that of the federal govern-
ment, states, rather than the federal government, are said to have enforcement
“primacy.”20  However there remains discretion within all enforcement regimes,
and to the extent that states maintain their primacy by exercising discretion in
conjunction with federal policy, a system of federal-state cooperation is neces-
sary in order to maintain consistency.  Cooperative federalism in environmental
law works as a relationship of negotiated legal power, where federal and state
legal power overlap in the quilt-work of federal statutes.  The Clean Water Act,
the Clean Air Act, and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,21 the
various states’ counterparts to those statutes, and the work of the federal and state
agencies who enforce them demonstrate cooperative federalism in practice.
In the case of climate change, one might well assume the federal government,
or its agent, the Environmental Protection Agency (“E.P.A.”), has taken a posi-
tion regarding the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“U.N.F.C.C.C.”) or Kyoto Protocol or both to drive cooperative federalism with
the states.22  If we extend cooperative federalism beyond its strictly legal nature
to include a policy agenda, the principle of cooperative federalism might there-
fore suggest that states should also be uninterested in carrying out any compul-
sory climate change law or policy.  To the extent that some states have at least
signed documents like memoranda of understanding, declarations, agreements,
and aide memoirs with foreign countries, we are witnessing instead what might
be called “uncooperative federalism,” certainly in regards to policy, and perhaps
also in regards to law.  Seen by its manifestations of simple legal mechanics, this
situation begins to look very much like an extension of the trend in favor of
states’ rights by the United States Supreme Court and similar-minded theorists.
The situation is a bit peculiar, however, when one considers that politically by
putting environmental rights back into the hands of the states, in this case, the
result in fact has been a more favorable national environmental policy.  This is
most apparent with greenhouse gas regulation, which will be discussed later in
section III A.
2. Preemption
In addition to the cooperative federalism principle that outlines the relation-
ship of the federal to the state governments regarding domestic environmental
issues, there also exists the familiar principle designed to determine the relation-
ship of the federal to state governments regarding international environmental
19 John C. Dernbach, Pennsylvania’s Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act: An Assessment of How “Cooperative Federalism” Can Make State Regulatory Programs More
Effective, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 903 (1986).
20 Id. at 904.
21 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328 (1982). See Dernbach, supra note 20.
22 Ann E. Carlson, Preemption and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281 (2003);
THE PEW FOUNDATION, Pew Report on the Bush Administration’s Response to Kyoto, in, INTER-
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2003).
96 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 2, Issue 1
International Environmental Agreements
issues known as preemption.23  From the language of the U. S. Constitution, one
might well assume that the operation of the principle of preemption is clear re-
garding its application to state treaty powers.  As the Supreme Court stated:
“From the Supremacy Clause comes the preemption doctrine, which preempts
state laws that Congress expressly preempts, when federal law occupies the field,
or where the law, generally or as applied, obstructs a federal law from achieving
its purpose.”24  Simply put, if a state law is in conflict with a federal law, includ-
ing the law of treaties, then that state law is preempted.  But what if there is an
international law situation that is likely to be subject to the federal law of treaties
and there is no ratified treaty?  In other words, what does preemption mean when
the source of law is international law?
Given that the natural environment knows no national borders, the regulation
of the natural environment has become a recurrent theme internationally regard-
ing questions of federalism.25  Conventionally stated, “from the international law
vantage, international law prevails over any domestic law.”26  At the same time,
there are limits.  As the Restatement makes clear: “But from the vantage of the
United States legal system, international law has no bearing on the Constitution,
which operates as an absolute constraint on how United States obligations may
be observed.”27
The United States Constitution in “Article VI expressly declares that the laws
and treaties of the United States are the supreme law of the land.”28  Likewise,
international agreements and federal determinations and interpretations of cus-
tomary international law29 are also considered supreme to state law and would
preempt such law according to the courts.30  State law is preempted when it is
inconsistent with federal law or policy.31  State law is also preempted if federal
23 Hodas, supra note 6, at 67.
24 Id., citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
25 See, e.g., MICHAEL KLOEPFER, ed., UMWELTF ¨ODERALISMUS: FO˝DERALISMUS DEUTSCHLAND:
MOTOR: ODER BREMSE FUR DEN UMWELTSCH ¨UTZ? WISSENSCHAFTLICHE TAGUNG DES FORSCHUNGSZEN-
TRUMS UMWELTRECH DER HUMBOLDT-UNIVERSIT ¨AT ZU BERLIN (Duncker & Humblot, 2002).
26 Swaine, Does Federalism, supra, note 6, at  449, citing Advisory Opinion, Applicability of the
Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June
1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12, 34, P57 (Apr. 26) (noting that it is a “fundamental principle of international law that
international law prevails over domestic law”); MARTIN DIXON & ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW  (4th ed. 2003).
27 See Swaine, Does Federalism, supra, note 6, at 449, citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(3) (1987).
28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 Reporter’s
Note 5 (1987).
29 Customary law is generally recognized as one of the three sources of international law.  Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice explicitly directs the Court to use conventions, customs
and general principles as primary sources of law in making its determinations. Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187.
30 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 Reporters’
notes 3 (1987) (referring to In Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) for the modern
view of customary international law.)
31 Id. at § 115(3).  For a discussion of how this view is in part an anomaly of U.S. legal thinking, see
Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 313, 329
(2001) cited in Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 6 at n.188.
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authority occupies the field even if the state law is not inconsistent with the
federal law or policy.32  As the Restatement clarifies: “In principle, a United
States treaty or international agreement may also be held to occupy a field and
preempt a subject, and supercede State law or policy even though that law or
policy is not necessarily in conflict with the international agreement, or when the
matter has apparently not been adjudicated.”33  In addition, “[a]s to international
law, it has been authoritatively stated that even a subject that is strictly of domes-
tic concern ‘ceases to be one solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the State,
[and] enters the domain governed by international law,’ if states conclude an
international agreement about it.”34
In the United States, under the doctrine of non-self execution, treaties may
lack preemptive force until implemented by domestic legislation.35  In those situ-
ations, theorists in support of a strong federal government have historically es-
poused what they have termed a “dormant treaty power,” that is the Treaty
Clause’s putative preemption of state authority even in the absence of any ratified
treaty.36  The assumption here would presumably be that if the United States has
signed a treaty, it would intend to ratify it and indeed the international principle
of pacta sunt servanda would require it.37  Moreover, if the United States were to
sign a treaty, one might well expect that the federal government intended to claim
the substantive area of the treaty for itself.
32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(3) (1987).
33 Id. at § 115 cmt. e.
34 Id. at § 302 Reporters’ Note 2 (quoting Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco (Great Britain
v. France), P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 4, p.26 (1923)).
35 John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L
L. 310, 323-27 (1992) (describing functional arguments, most relating to legislative authority, for disfa-
voring direct application). To the extent that the non-self-execution doctrine concerns the Supremacy
Clause it pertains directly to the federal government’s authority relative to the states. See Foster v. Neil-
son, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.) (concluding that, save where state parties agreed that a
treaty would not be self-executing, the Supremacy Clause required that a treaty “be regarded in courts of
justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any
legislative provision”), overruled in part, United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 88-89 (1833) (modify-
ing Foster, on its facts, where subsequently unearthed Spanish version of treaty suggested that it was self-
executing); see also infra note 263 (discussing Foster). But the insistence in Foster v. Neilson on a strong
presumption in favor of self-execution has arguably eroded, making reliance on the Supremacy Clause
more attenuated. Compare Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Treaties: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 346-47 (1995) (arguing for self-execution based, in part, on
Supremacy Clause), and Carlos Manuel Va´zquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. Rev. 2154, 2157-
58 (1999) (suggesting the Supremacy Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, indicates a “default
rule” of self-execution), with Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 447-49 (2000) (arguing that the Supremacy Clause does
not prohibit federal lawmakers from limiting the domestic application of treaties), and Swaine, Does
Federalism, supra, note 6, at 413-14, citing John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and
Structural Defense of Non- Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2219-20 (1999) (arguing that the
Constitution “. . .allow[s] the three branches to defer execution of a treaty until the President and Con-
gress can determine how best to implement the nation’s treaty obligations”).
36 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 5, at 1138.
37 The United States must perform in good faith all international agreements it has entered into and
which are in force under the international principle of pacta sunt servanda. In addition, the principle
implies “that international obligations survive restrictions imposed by domestic law.” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 321 cmt. a (1987).
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In the area of environmental law generally, but especially regarding green-
house gas regulation, one can best analyze state-federal cooperation and pre-
emption issues by applying a series of steps.  First, at the clearest level of statu-
tory law, one can observe that there is no federal statute that directly regulates
greenhouse gas emissions and therefore, no states’ laws are statutorily preempted
in this area.38  Second, no federal judicial decisions to date have found any fed-
eral constitutional statutory or regulatory pre-emption regarding greenhouse
gases.  Finally, if that were not enough, the E.P.A. went further.  Rather than just
leave legal scholars searching for an absence of evidence, the E.P.A. actively,
explicitly, and affirmatively “announced that it does not have authority under the
Clean Air Act to regulate carbon dioxide [the primary greenhouse gas] as a crite-
ria pollutant39 for which it would be obligated to establish a national ambient air
quality standard.”40  One must keep in mind however, that “. . .even if the E.P.A.
were to designate carbon dioxide to be a criteria pollutant, and were to promul-
gate national ambient air quality standards for carbon dioxide, that would not
preclude a state from adopting and implementing a more stringent standard for
that pollutant.”41
3. Foreign Affairs Doctrine
Third in the list of conventional tools of analysis are the foreign affairs doc-
trine and the associated issue of whether state laws addressing greenhouse gas
emissions violate this Constitutional doctrine.42  In his consideration of environ-
mental protection agreements entered into between states in the United States and
foreign governments, David R. Hodas begins his analyses from the traditional
position that state laws are preempted when they conflict with ratified treaties
and the federal laws implementing them.43  He goes on to note, however, that the
current United States Supreme Court appears to be developing an uncertain for-
eign affairs doctrine, both in its specifics and in its boundaries of coverage.44
38 Hodas, supra note 6, at 74.
39 Criteria pollutants are those air pollutants for which the Clean Air Act has established national
numeric standards for emissions. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401.
40 Hodas, supra note 6, at 74, citing Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines,
Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, 68 FR 52,922, 52,925-931 (Sept. 8, 2003).
41 Hodas, supra note 6, at 74; 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
42 Hodas, supra note 6, at 75-79.
43 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879); Ware
v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796).
44 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2389, 2401 (2003) (compare Justice Souter for
the majority, “[i]t is a fair question whether respect for the executive foreign relations power requires a
categorical choice between the contrasting theories of field and conflict preemption . . . but the question
requires no answer here [,]” with Justice Ginsburg, dissenting:
. . .[W]e would reserve foreign affairs preemption for circumstances where the President, acting
under statutory or constitutional authority, has spoken clearly to the issue at hand. ‘[T]he Fram-
ers did not make the judiciary the overseer of our government. . .’ And judges should not be the
expositors of the Nation’s foreign policy, which is the role they play by acting when the Presi-
dent himself has not taken a clear stand. As I see it, courts step out of their proper role when they
rely on no legislative or even executive text, but only on inference and implication, to preempt
state laws on foreign affairs grounds. . .
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The uncertainty is allowed in part because in the few foreign affairs cases that the
Supreme Court has considered, it has not addressed the issue of whether the state
greenhouse gas laws and initiatives offend foreign affairs powers of the President
or Congress under the Constitution.45  In these few cases, the Supreme Court has
not seen fit to resolve this issue but, rather reminiscent of the political nature of
cooperative federalism, has deemed it to be a political question better resolved by
the President and Congress.46
Consequently, Hodas concludes that “no matter what theory of preemption is
operative, be it traditional preemption, dormant foreign affairs preemption, or the
recently proposed (and very attractive) approach of dormant Treaty Clause pre-
emption, there is simply no federalism concern here.”47  This is because the state
greenhouse gas control initiatives that he considers do not conflict with any trea-
ties, federal laws, or executive agreements.48  “They do not impose any obliga-
tion, limitation, or condition on foreign government, nor do they interfere with
federal settlement of disputes and claims against foreign countries or busi-
nesses.”49  Hodas concludes that it is entirely constitutional for states to think
globally and act locally, because the chief federal executive’s administration
views the states’ efforts to be in the nation’s interest.50
For more detailed analysis of the confusion in this area see The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading
Cases: Constitutional Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 235 (2003) (arguing that the dormant foreign affairs
preemption concept is incoherent and deserves “burial”); Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 5;
Hodas, supra note 6 at 77, citing Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis,
83 AM. J. INT’L L. 832 (1989).
45 Hodas, supra note 6, at 77-78.
46 The Supreme Court has a long history of ruling that matters related to foreign affairs are nonjusti-
ciable political questions. See e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). However, the
Court has ruled on the merits with respect to whether the President has the power to enter into executive
agreements instead of treaties. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); See also Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (court decision as to whether the subject matter of a treaty is constitu-
tional). The Supreme Court has held that political questions include disputes about: a) when a “war”
begins or ends in Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57 (1923); b) the recognition of foreign
governments or Indian tribes, in United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) and United States v.
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913); and c) the validity, ratification, and interpretation of treaties in
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of the President’s exercise of war powers, however
federal courts have reasoned that disputes over the President’s exercise of war powers are political ques-
tions. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936
(1974) (challenge to Vietnam War); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1251 (1984) (challenge to President’s use of the military in El Salvador); Ange v. Bush, 752 F.
Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990) (challenge to the first Iraq war). The application of the political question doc-
trine has been the subject of vigorous scholarly debate. See, e.g., Martin Redish, Judicial Review and the
Political Question, 79 NW. U.L. REV. 1031 (1985); Hodas, supra note 6, at 78, citing Louis Henkin,
Vietnam in the Courts of the United States: Political Questions, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 284 (1969).
47 Hodas, supra note 6, at 79 (Citations omitted).
48 Prasad Sharma, Comment: Restoring Participatory Democracy: Why the United States Should
Listen to Citizen Voices While Engaging in International Environmental Lawmaking, 12 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 1215, 1227 (Spring, 1998).
49 Hodas, supra note 6, at 79.
50 Id. at 81.
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Tools of States’ Treaty Powers Analysis: New and Unconventional Tools
1. Leaving the Dormant Treaty Power to Sleep
In his analysis of the dormant treaty power, Edward T. Swaine makes an ex-
cellent point as to why the dormant treaty power and other so-called “dormant”
doctrines are precisely that: dormant.51  The historical record shows that the fed-
eral government has not precluded all state activities affecting foreign relations
but only those state activities that bargain with foreign powers on matters of
national concern.  As a result, states have authority to engage in ordinary contrac-
tual relations with foreign governments but cannot bargain with foreign govern-
ments to secure concessions.52  Since this record is so well documented by
Swaine and Hodas,53 I shall not repeat its details here.  However, the failure of
the Constitution to make explicit what powers are included in foreign affairs has
left it to the courts to decide.  Swaine notes, “for as many allusions as one can
find to the competence of states in the arena of foreign affairs, there may be just
as many alluding to the incompetence of the judiciary.”54  Despite the position
maintained by the Supreme Court in the seventy year range of cases thoroughly
discussed by David R. Hodas, the branches of government have not fared any
better in attempting politically to delineate the foreign affairs powers that are
dormant.55
The dormant treaty power may be said to be over inclusive, because it con-
demns a wide range of arrangements that states seek to make with foreign gov-
ernments.56  Some bargaining between states and foreign governments may be
unworthy of congressional attention, such as the negotiations between Virginia
and the Kingdom of Belgium to open a foreign trade office in Brussels, for exam-
ple.57  “Similarly, whatever the scope of the Compact Clause [Article I, Section
10, clause 3], it does not appear to have been contemplated that it would extend
to state activities of no national interest.”58  Therefore, Professor Swaine con-
cludes that states may conclude binding agreements with foreign governments
without federal approval, particularly if there is no national interest in the state
activity.59
51 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 5, at 1150.
52 Id. at 1138.
53 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 5; Hodas, supra note 6.
54 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 5, at 1151.
55 Id. at 1154.
56 Id. at 1269.
57 Blaine Liner, States and Localities in the Global Marketplace, Intergovernmental Persp., Spring
1990, at 11 (updating the impact of Virginia’s choice to place an economic development office in Brus-
sels); see also, Brenda S. Beerman, Comment, State Involvement in the Promotion of Export Trade: Is It
Time to Rethink the Concept of Federalism as It Pertains to Foreign Relations?, 21 N.C.J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 187, 206 (1995) (describing the state of North Carolina’s activities), cited in Swaine, Negoti-
ating Federalism, supra note 5, at 1269-70.
58 Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 5, at 1272.
59 Id. at 1273.
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2. Waking the Treaty-Compact
To combat the dormant treaty power, Swaine applies a new sense of federal-
ism to the little-used and now-resurrected concept of the “compact,” which, like
the “agreement” is permitted to be used by states in the United States Constitu-
tion, while treaties, alliances and confederations are not.60  He notes that if con-
sented-to compacts outside the scope of Congress’s legislative authority are
binding and enforceable compacts, but not federal law, it may seem natural to
suppose that they are state law.61 Yet they may be more.  If federal action has
failed, the states may make compacts to achieve the preferred solution.62
Of course state law pervades even those compacts within Congress’ legislative
competence regardless of whether the state law replicates federal obligations or
concerns itself with matters only of interest to a participating state.63  Swaine
then shifts his emphasis laterally when he writes:
Such compacts may also be enforceable on the international plane.  Consistent
with its equivocal remove from constitutional matters, international law leaves to
national constitutions in the first instance the question of whether subnational
entities enjoy the capacity to enter into international agreements. . . .  Due to the
infrequency with which U.S. foreign compacts have been perfected, and to the
nominal constitutional prohibition against state ‘treaties,’ there is no settled view
as to their international consequence, but an important factor in conferring legiti-
macy is the consent and control of the national government—which is surely
enhanced where the compact tracked terms negotiated and ratified by national
representatives.64  The likely result, then, is that state obligations under foreign
compacts would be enforceable in international law.65
To illustrate how a treaty-compact device works, Swaine begins with two ex-
amples from the United States federal government that coincidentally concern
themselves with the regulation of the natural environment: the Ross Dam
Treaty66 and the Pacific Salmon Treaty of 1985.67  The United States and Canada
entered into the Ross Dam Treaty to establish water levels behind the Ross
60 Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 6, at 499.
61 Id. at 518.
62 The recently litigated 1998 Multistate Agreement on tobacco litigation (MSA) might fit either
description. See Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 67 MO. L. REV. 83-
90 (2003) (describing genesis of MSA); see Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 359-60 (4th Cir.
2002) (concluding that MSA was not a compact requiring congressional consent); see also Jill Elaine
Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REV. 1,
10-11 (1997) (asserting that “threatened federal action spurs most compacts”), cited in Swaine, Does
Federalism, supra note 6, at 502.
63 Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 6, at 518.
64 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 301 cmt. g &
302 cmt. f (1987) (indicating that some foreign compacts entered into by U.S. states may be international
agreements within the meaning of international law, but excluding those not requiring congressional
consent).
65 Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 6, at 520-21.
66 Treaty Relating to the Skagit River and Ross Lake, and the Seven Mile Reservoir on the Pend
d’Orielle River, Apr. 2, 1984, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11.088.
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Dam.68  “The Ross Dam Treaty merges a treaty with a compact-like device69 as a
means of asserting national control over a matter implicating subnational author-
ity, with Seattle’s incentive deriving from its own self-interest in the resolution
and the pressure exerted by the ongoing International Joint Commission proceed-
ings” on Seattle and British Columbia to reach agreement with respect to the
water levels behind the Ross Dam.70  For most federal preemption situations,
these analyses will apply to the federal actions taken or omitted (in the case of
dormant powers), but when the federal government goes further in its actions, the
analysis must accommodate that further action.
3. De-emption as the Solution to Uncooperative Federalism in International
Environmental Agreements
De-emption concerns the explicit withdrawal of the federal government from
an area and whether it can be treated as an affirmative statement that the federal
government will not be acting in this area, as opposed to an area left to question
because the federal government has never acted in the area nor commented upon
it.
The United States government’s actions and statements against the Kyoto Pro-
tocol are best analyzed at three different levels: 1) those that are legal actions and
statements of the government and its agencies in the province of their work, 2)
those that are the policy actions and statements of the government and its agen-
cies in the province of their work, and 3) those that are extraneous to the legal or
policy provinces of the work of the government or its agencies.
Chronologically arranged, the first legal action in the chain of events came
with the U.N.F.C.C.C.,71 which sets a general framework for the goal of limiting
greenhouse gases.  Like all framework agreements, the U.N.F.C.C.C. lacked spe-
cific dates, amounts of reduction, or methods by which to achieve the reduc-
tions.72  Indeed, while ratifying the U.N.F.C.C.C., “the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations noted that a decision to be bound by targets and timetables
would require renewed Senate advice and consent.”73  The United States signed
the U.N.F.C.C.C., President Bush submitted it to the United States Senate for
Article II ratification, and the United States Senate ratified it, making it the “law
of the United States.”74
67 Treaty Concerning Pacific Salmon, Jan. 28, 1985, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11-091, amended by
Agreement Relating to and Amending Annexes I and IV of the Treaty Concerning Pacific Salmon, June
30, 1999, U.S.-Can.
68 Treaty Relating to the Skagit River and Ross Lake, and the Seven Mile Reservoir on the Pend
d’Orielle River, Preamble, Apr. 2, 1984, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11.088.
69 Swaine notes that “[n]o compact was necessary, presumably, because Seattle, rather than the state
of Washington, was a party.” Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 6, at 512-13 n. 432.
70 Swaine, Does Federalism, supra note 6, at 512-513.
71 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, New York.
72 Id.
73 S. Exec. Rept. 55, 102d Cong., 2d Sess, Oct. 1, 1992, at 14.
74 U.S. CONST. art II.
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When it came time to set dates, gas amounts, and methods of reduction, the
U.N.F.C.C.C. nations, including the United States, met in Kyoto, Japan to agree
upon and sign a protocol.  Indeed it has become clear among experts in interna-
tional public law today that rarely are treaties produced without bundles of an-
nexes and protocols.75  On November 12, 1998 the United States signed the
Kyoto Protocol; however, the United States Senate never ratified it.76
In addition to the President having a constitutional role in treaty negotiation
and submission to the Senate (or more direct negotiation in the case of an execu-
tive agreement), the President has the service of executive officers among the
various executive agencies such as the E.P.A.  Christine Whitman (then Adminis-
trator of the E.P.A.) stated on March 27, 2001, “We have no interest in imple-
menting that treaty.”77
One may ask how the Bush administration in effect could “unsign” the Proto-
col that the Clinton administration had signed.78  Presidential spokesman Ari
Fleischer at a press conference reiterated the Bush administration’s position that
signing the Kyoto Protocol did not bind the United States and therefore there was
no reason to unsign the treaty.79  Echoing the letter, but perhaps not the spirit of
the international principle of pacta sunt servanda, Fleischer stated that the signa-
ture only prohibits the United States from working against the treaty.80  This
statement fails to address the President’s clear act of legal discretion in not sub-
mitting the signed Protocol to the Senate for ratification, regardless of any prior
statements by the Senate as to what it would do with a vote on the Protocol.
Politically, that act of legal discretion can be interpreted to mean that the Presi-
dent regards submission to the Kyoto protocol as a waste of time or it can be
interpreted to mean that he supports the Senate’s stated position.  The latter is
more likely the case because if he did not agree with the Senate’s position, he
could still submit a protocol destined not to be ratified, and then make clear that
he had done what he could, and that it was the Senate that blocked the measure.
In this case, the Bush administration has stated it will not attempt to undermine
the Kyoto Protocol.81  In fact, on numerous occasions, President Bush has stated
that he supports the U.N.F.C.C.C., which acts as the guiding principles behind
75 Lecture by Prof. Emer. Bernhard Schloh, University of Hamburg, Germany, and former counsel to
the European Commission, Duquesne University School of Law (March 4, 2004).
76 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Web Site (for a list of signatories
to the the Kyoto Protocol), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/kpstats.pdf.
77 U.S. Won’t Follow Climate Treaty Provisions, Whitman Says, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2001, at A
19, cited in, Greg Kahn, Between Empire and Community: The United States and Multilateralism 2001-
2003: A Mid-Term Assessment: Environment: The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol under the Bush Adminis-
tration, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 548, 551 (2003).
78 Kahn, supra note 78, at 555.
79 Id.
80 Id. See also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 312 (3) & cmt. i (1987) (“Prior to entry into force of an international agreement, a state that has signed
the agreement or expressed its consent to be bound is obligated to refrain from acts that would defeat the
object and purpose of the agreement”).
81 Kahn, supra note 78, at 555.
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the Kyoto Protocol, but he has withdrawn from any negotiations dealing with the
Protocol.82
What remains then, is to determine whether the several states of the United
States can in fact be the legally responsible parties to carry out a sustainable
development agenda for the twenty-first century by directly agreeing with foreign
countries to do what the unratified Kyoto Protocol leaves undone.  At the level of
policy, between the environmental groups that pressured the United States to
make specific commitments to limit greenhouse gases and the industry lobbyists,
it was industry that won, as attested by the Senate’s Byrd-Hagel Resolution,
which passed by a vote of 95 to 0 on July 25, 1997.83  The resolution conveyed
that the United States should not sign the Kyoto agreement “unless the protocol
or other agreement also mandated new specific scheduled commitments to limit
or reduce green house gas emissions for developing country parties within the
same compliance period” or it would “result in serious harm to the economy of
the United States.”84  Through this resolution, the United States implicitly repu-
diated those principles of the U.N.F.C.C.C. that had already been ratified by the
United States, which called for developed countries to take the lead in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.85  As a result of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, the Clin-
ton administration announced that it would not submit the Kyoto Protocol for
Senate ratification until it had secured agreements to participate in the Kyoto
Protocol from developing nations.86
The Byrd-Hagel Resolution was not the only policy act by the federal govern-
ment to indicate that it would not ratify, enforce, or otherwise approve the Kyoto
Protocol.  Congress, in an effort to make sure no “backdoor” ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol would take place, attempted to prohibit executive branch agen-
cies, including the E.P.A., from working on climate issues in the executive
branch appropriations acts.87  This atmosphere effectively hindered the state and
local governments who voluntarily wished to take steps to reduce greenhouse
emissions from working with the E.P.A.88
The Bush administration came into office in January 2001 and one of its first
actions was to send a letter to four senators, including Nebraska Senator Chuck
Hagel, to outline its environmental policy.89  According to that letter, President
82 Kahn, supra note 78, at 559.  See also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 332 (1) & cmt. a (1987) (“. . .withdrawal of a party from an agreement, may take
place only (a) in conformity with the agreement. . .”).  President Bush did withdraw from the Kyoto
Protocol in conformity with its terms.
83 S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 22, 1997), Congressional Record, 143 S8117, daily ed.
(July 25, 1997), cited in  DONALD A. BROWN, AMERICAN HEAT 26, 31 (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
84 Morrissey, Global Climate Change, cited in DONALD A. BROWN, AMERICAN HEAT 31, (Rowman
& Littlefield 2002).
85 BROWN, supra note 85, at 31.
86 Id. at 36.
87 See, e.g., Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Independent
Agencies Act, 1999, Public Law 105-279, 112 Stat. 2496, cited in BROWN supra note 85, at 37.
88 BROWN, supra note 85, at 37.
89 Kahn, supra note 78, at 551.
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Bush agreed with the Senate in opposing the Kyoto Protocol because it exempted
eighty percent of the world, including large population centers in China and In-
dia, which would seriously harm the United States’ economy.90  As support for
this position, the Bush administration noted that only Romania had ratified the
treaty and that this signaled that worldwide, others agree with the President’s
position on the treaty.91  Since then, more than one hundred countries have rati-
fied the Kyoto Protocol.92 May one use this evidence to now assume that others
“worldwide” disagree?
Extra icing may have been added to the de-emption cake when federal offi-
cials with no legal or policy-making capacity in matters of environmental regula-
tion publicly recorded their opinions on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
As the New York Times noted: “Senator Chuck Hagel echoed the anger of other
United States legislators with the Clinton administration’s position when he said,
‘any way you measure this, this is a bad deal for America.’”93  Senator Hagel
predicted that if the Kyoto Protocol ever appeared for ratification before the Sen-
ate it would be dead on arrival.94  Condoleeza Rice, President Bush’s national
security advisor, has also publicly stated that “Kyoto is dead.”95
Consequently, one could say that at best, it would appear that the United States
federal government’s approach supports existing and encourages future state and
local innovations regarding global warming policy.96  It has been suggested that
this federalism approach has come about as a result of the international criticism
the United States federal government has received for its failure to respond to
global warming.97  In order to deflect this criticism the federal government cites
the state and local efforts as an approach to address global warming from the
90 Letter to Members of the Senate on the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, 37 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 444 (Mar. 13, 2001), cited in Kahn supra note 78, at 551.
91 Excerpts: White House Briefing Comments on Kyoto Protocol, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INT’L INFO.
PROGRAMS, Mar. 28, 2001, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/climate/01032801.html (last visited
Mar. 6, 2003), cited in Kahn supra note 78, at 551.
92 UN Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Nov. 1987.
93 William Stevens, “Meeting Reaches Accord to Reduce Greenhouse Gases,” NEW YORK TIMES,
December 11, 1997, A10, International section, cited in BROWN supra note 85, at 37.
94 BROWN supra note 85, at 37.
95 Patrick J. Michaels, “The Kyoto Killers,” August 8, 2001, The Cato Institute, at https://
www.cato.org/dailys/08-08-01.html.
96 Hodas, supra note 6, at 81.
97 Andrew C. Revkin & Jennifer Lee, White House Attacked for Letting States Lead on Climate
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at A32 [hereinafter Climate Policy] (paraphrasing Dr. Harlan L.
Watson, the Bush Administration’s chief negotiator at the Milan Conference of the Parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in December 2003).  The EPA’s global warm-
ing website takes a similar approach. On its website, EPA touts a range of state activities as important
policy initiatives: “Action at the state level is a key component of the US response to the potential
impacts posed by climate change.” See http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ActionsS-
tate.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2004). The site reviews twenty-eight state plans, many case studies, and
legislative efforts across the nation. As to local initiatives, EPA’s position is that:
Cities and towns across the U.S. are on the front lines of climate change and feel the effects of
changes such as in precipitation, temperature, sea-level rise, and air quality. Cities and towns are
also in the position to take a variety of energy efficiency and renewable energy actions that can
have multiple benefits including saving money, creating jobs, promoting sustainable growth, and
reducing criteria pollutants.
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bottom (that is, local and state initiatives) up, rather than from the top (that is,
federal initiatives) down.98
The conventional position that one might take regarding states’ rights to enter
into agreements with foreign nations is that the states are pre-empted from doing
so in those areas of the law where the federal government has clearly taken ac-
tion.  Having done so, that area of the law is either explicitly or implicitly an area
controlled by the federal government.  But what happens if the federal govern-
ment takes action and thereby presumably pre-empts the states from doing so, but
then rescinds that action?  In this case, I maintain that the federal jurisdictional
claim has moved from pre-emption to “de-emption.”  That is to say, not only can
the federal government no longer claim to be active in the field and therefore pre-
emptive of state action, it cannot even claim to have been silent in the field.  It
has extinguished the possibility that this was an area for federal and not state
action in which the federal government had simply not yet acted.  In this case
rather, the rescission of action (such as the explicit refusal even to submit the
Kyoto Protocol to the United States Senate for ratification by Presidents Bill
Clinton or George W. Bush) is tantamount to saying simply that the federal gov-
ernment will not be acting in this area, thereby relinquishing its pre-emptive ju-
risdictional claim and expressly handing the job back to the states.  Furthermore,
although the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the United States Constitution
provides that state law must yield to federal law “any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding,”99 that does not prohibit
states from acting in the field altogether.  “When a state law or constitutional
provision merely supplements a federal provision, it is not ‘contrary’ to that pro-
vision within the meaning of Article VI.”100
This is precisely where de-emption enters the picture.  Not only has the federal
government not taken any legal action with which state initiatives conflict, the
federal government, through its treaty-responsible organ, the United States Sen-
ate, has explicitly stated it will not ratify the current stock-in-trade of interna-
tional greenhouse gas regulation—the Kyoto Protocol.  This active step to
declare that the federal government will not act is more than just not acting, it is
an affirmative step that gives states a clear and unambiguous message that the
federal government will not be acting in that area.  Hence, the states are not pre-
empted from acting; on the contrary, the federal government has de-empted itself
and thereby released the power to the states.
So one turns to examine the nature of the various work agreements already in
place in the bottom-up attempt by states to control greenhouse gas emissions.
Pioneers Robert Shinn and Matt Polsky maintain that all of these agreements
have the common goal of “sustainability.”101  Three factors make up this exami-
See http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ActionsLocal.html (last visited Jan. 10,
2004), cited in Hodas, supra note 6, at 80.
98 Climate Policy, supra note 98, as cited in Hodas, supra note 6, at 80-81.
99 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
100 Ken Gormley, Exploring A European Constitution: Unexpected Lessons from the American Expe-
rience, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 69, 79 (2003).
101 Shinn, supra, note 2, at 102.
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nation: First, what agreements among these are binding?102  Second, what func-
tion do non-binding “programs,” “workshops” and “presentations” have?  Third,
to what degree is state-federal co-operative federalism practiced in these
agreements?103
As an example, now it would seem that the federal government has withdrawn
from the area of regulating carbon dioxide emissions.104  Yet due to international
criticism for its lack of effort, the United States has encouraged state efforts in
addressing carbon dioxide emissions as a bottom up approach.105  The current
position of the United States at the national level is a hands-off approach as to
regulation of additional pollutants not included as criteria pollutants under the
Clean Air Act, due in large part to the lobbying efforts of fossil fuel interests.106
This national position could last for an indefinite time period.  So, at the present
time the withdrawal by the federal government could be seen as an affirmative
statement that the federal government will not be acting in this area and it is
therefore left open to the states.  However, the President and Congress have the
power in the future to preempt the states in this area by enacting legislation or
occupying the field.  It is worth noting for application in international law that
the principle of preemption has been instituted fundamentally in the acquis com-
munitaire of European Union law in the related concepts of proportionality and
subsidiarity.107  Within that system of international preemption, it is clearer when
member states may make treaties with third countries outside of the European
Union.108
The Strange Bedfellows of States’ Rights and Protection of the Natural
Environment: New Compacts in Action
Conventional wisdom sets up our attitude toward international agreements as
an enthymeme.  The enthymeme works as follows: the United States Constitution
tells us that if there is to be a treaty, then the federal government must conclude
it, and that if the federal government concludes it, then it is binding.109  Since we
think of “federal” as a dialectic term paired with “state” in American legal think-
102 A beginning guide to answer this question is the United Nations’ Treaty Reference Guide, which
provides guidance as to the binding nature of various international documents by category.  One must
remain aware, of course, that some documents use the categorical names differently, and that the names
alone are not a certain test of the binding nature of the documents. See, http://untreaty.un.org/English/
guide.asp.
103 Shinn, supra note 2, at 102.
104 Climate Policy, supra note 98.
105 Id.
106 Dernbach, supra note 20.
107 In the celebrated Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 1141 (1964), the European Court of
Justice noted that “By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own
personality and its (own) legal capacity . . . the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit
within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and
themselves.”
108 Rudolf Geiger, External Competences of the European Union Treaty-Making Power of Its Mem-
ber States, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 319, 326 (1997).
109 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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ing, one cannot help but supply the unsaid terms regarding states when these
pronouncements on federal power are made.  Thinking in dialectic pairs, then,
when the term “federal” is used, the dialectic counterpart “state” is assumed.
When the federal is said to “have the power,” the dialectic counterpart that one
supplies by operation of the enthymeme is that the state does not possess the
power.  And finally, if the federal exercise of its international agreement power
through treaties is “binding,” then an additional enthymeme is constructed in
which the term to characterize state power in international agreements is missing,
but the dialectic comparison to “binding” will most easily be fulfilled by the term
“non-binding.”
With this enthymematic structure in place, we may unreflectively treat states
as objects internal to the federation’s subject.  The historical-empirical evidence
disputes this supplied term to the enthymeme, however.  The historical-empirical
record of public law does not give us a tidy catalogue of types of agreements and
powers and levels of enforceability.  It is perhaps because of this lack of clear
categories and levels that the entire area is ignored.  That ignorance is only due to
the sloppiness of the catalogue, however, and not due to its existence.
In international co-operation in general, and in particular in international envi-
ronmental co-operation, it is often the case that nations will enter into a frame-
work convention or treaty that sets forth an outline of the problems to be
addressed, the establishment of the institutions that will address it, the types of
measures to be taken, the goals to be achieved through these institutions and
measures.  In this vein, one may look to the Chlorofluorocarbon (“C.F.C.”)
Treaty110 and the U.N.F.C.C.C., for example.  Thereafter, specialists will work to
determine precisely how those institutions and organs will function, the methods
by which the measures will be affected, and the assessment of the results.  In this
vein, one may look to the Montreal Protocol111 or the Kyoto Protocol, for exam-
ple, in their respective roles to give specificity to the C.F.C. Treaty or the
U.N.F.C.C.C. Treaty, respectively.
While the United States participated in the U.N.F.C.C.C. and ratified the
Treaty, when it came time to put some flesh on the bones of the Framework
through the Kyoto Protocol, the United States balked.112  The refusal of the
United States to follow the Kyoto Protocol has ramifications far beyond the lit-
eral and figurative borders of the United States.113  It is no secret that although
the United States is only approximately six percent of the world’s population, it
consumes approximately twenty-five percent of the world’s natural resources,
including fossil fuels, the burning of which results in global warming and climate
change.114  Under the terms of the Kyoto Protocol, any signatory state’s obliga-
110 Chloroflourocarbon Treaty, Montreal 1987.
111 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).  As amended up to 1999, available at http://hq.unep.org/ozone/pdfs/
Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf.
112 BROWN, supra note 85, at 35-36.
113 Id. at 39-40.
114 See CIA World Fact Book, available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook.
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tions are only triggered after fifty-five states have ratified and when more then
fifty-five percent of emissions are under control of the Protocol.115  After most of
the smaller states had approved the Protocol, it became clear that the fifty-five
states and fity-five prercent needed cound not be met if neither the United States
nor Russia agreed.116  During an international trade show in Cologne, Germany
on June 10, 2004, Russian acting chief executive Mikhail Rogankov of Kyoto
Protocol implementation organization, the Carbon Energy Fund, announced that
Russia would be certain to ratify the Protocol “within the next six months” and
that “it is only a question of when,”117 and on November 4, 2004, Russian Presi-
dent Vladimir Putin signed the federal law to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, making
Russia the one hundred and twenty-sixth country to do so.118  The U.S. refusal to
follow the Kyoto Protocol is measurable not only in tons of carbon emitted into
the atmosphere each day, or in the mean global temperature increases, but also in
the signal that a world leader in industry, technology and economy sends when it
practices such Machiavellian statehood.
1. New Jersey Practices De-Emption
What extra effects in the law or policy of environmental regulation might de-
emption afford?  A look at New Jersey’s efforts provides an example.  Given the
similarities of population density and coastline resource dependency, New Jersey
and the Netherlands found themselves in similar situations regarding greenhouse
gases and global warming.119  Since New Jersey is a coastal state, it is threatened
directly by the rise in sea levels that would result from global warming.120  The
impact of higher sea levels could increase flooding and destroy ecosystems
which in turn would decrease tourism.121  In addition, global warming threatens
public health in New Jersey by increasing air pollution.122  Also, higher tempera-
tures and the accompanying increased evaporation magnify the frequency and
intensity of droughts and rainstorms.123
Recognizing that (i) the U.N.F.C.C.C. was written to be completed by a docu-
ment like the Kyoto Protocol, (ii) that the United States would not be adopting
115 Steven Lee Myers, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Russia’s Lower House Approves Kyoto Treaty on
Emissions, A3.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Steven Lee Myers, Russia Sings Global Warming Pact, THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 5,
2004. Putin’s signature followed ratification of the Protocol by the State Duma (October 22, 2004) and
the Federation Council (October 27, 2004). The final step in the ratification process will be the deposit of
the formal instrument of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in New York. This
is expected to occur int eh coming weeks. The Kyoto Protocol will enter into force ninety days after
Russia’s instrument of ratification has been received. See http://unfccc.int/ (last accessed November 29,
2004).
119 Shinn, supra note 2.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 97.
123 Id.
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the Kyoto Protocol any time soon, and (iii) that if Russia does ratify, the United
States participation is not legally necessary, states like New Jersey took it upon
themselves to negotiate an agreement with foreign partners that would reflect the
goals of the U.N.F.C.C.C. Treaty and Kyoto Protocol through more specific doc-
uments designed to create institutions and methods for achieving the
U.N.F.C.C.C. goal of slowing global warming.124  To effect this end and in a
manner not unlike the U.N.F.C.C.C., on June 5, 1998, the Department Environ-
mental Protection of the State of New Jersey (“N.J.D.E.P”) and The Ministry of
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment of The Netherlands signed a Let-
ter of Intent to convey “the understanding of the Signatories of their intention to
cooperate in addressing the challenges posed by the prospect of climate
change.”125
Thereafter, on December 7, 1999, with both a purpose and a method not unlike
the Kyoto Protocol, the same two parties signed a more specific agreement—an
Aide Memoire126—that “summariz[ed] the main topics of discussion and agreed
conclusions for further actions of the Technical meeting, held in Scheveningen,
The Netherlands December 6 and 7, 1999.”127  The Commissioner of the
N.J.D.E.P., Robert C. Shinn, Jr., together with Matt Polsky, later characterized
their efforts by noting that “[s]tates should not dismiss the possibilities for crea-
tive initiatives at the international level, even if this does go against conventional
wisdom.”128
To take its greenhouse gas concerns yet further on the international scene, in
2000, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection signed the Inter-
national Declaration on Cleaner Production, committing the agency to join with
other states and nations to seek reductions in emissions to increase environmental
and economic sustainability worldwide.129  Granted, this declaration is neither a
convention130 nor a treaty and thus does not bind New Jersey in the “conven-
124 Laura Kosloff & Mark Trexler, State Climate Change Initiatives: Think Locally, Act Globally, 18
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 46, 47-48 (Winter, 2004), for a discussion on other states’ initiatives.
125 Shinn, supra note 2.
126 The United Nations Treaty Reference Guide does not define “aide memoire.”  United Nations, The
United Nations Treaty Collection: Treaty Reference Guide, 1999, at http://untreaty.un.org/English/
guide.pdf [hereinafter Treaty Reference Guide].
127 NJDEP Press Release Dec. 12, 1999, Commissioner Shinn Signs Historic Agreement to Develop
Prototype for International Emissions Trade, available at http://www.state.nj.us/dep/newsrel/releases/
99_0151.htm.
128 Shinn, supra note 2.
129 Id.
130 The United Nations Treaty Service Reference Guide defines “convention”:
The term “convention” again can have both a generic and a specific meaning. (a) Convention as
a generic term: Art.38 (1) (a) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice refers to “inter-
national conventions, whether general or particular” as a source of law, apart from international
customary rules and general principles of international law and - as a secondary source - judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists. This generic use of the term
“convention” embraces all international agreements, in the same way as does the generic term
“treaty”. Black letter law is also regularly referred to as “conventional law”, in order to distin-
guish it from the other sources of international law, such as customary law or the general princi-
ples of international law. The generic term “convention” thus is synonymous with the generic
term “treaty”. (b) Convention as a specific term: Whereas in the last century the term “conven-
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tional” way.  However, it is nevertheless an exercise of state power in foreign
relations, and in this case, in a manner at odds with federal foreign relations on
the issue of emissions reductions.  Thus, while states typically work with the
federal government to establish a relatively unified body of environmental law
for domestic matters under the rubric of “cooperative federalism,”131 when it
comes to international matters, states may and have sought their own path.  When
the federal government, which has explicitly taken the regulation of the natural
environment as a federal power, fails to protect the environment, states can and
do take actions both domestically and internationally.
The “subsidiarity principle”132 borrowed from European Union law “states
that each problem is best addressed at the level most affected by the problem;”
thus, the best way to solve a problem is to address it at the lowest level it can be
solved.133  Global warming is one of those issues that is global in scale but has
local effects.134  Yet local action is not common even though the Earth Summit
back in 1992 called for action at the local level to address sustainability issues.135
Air pollution flows across political boundaries and the N.J.D.E.P. has there-
fore become active in national and international organizations which attempt to
reduce air pollution.136  These organizations include the Center for Clean Air
Policy, the North American Research Strategy for Tropospheric Ozone, the
Ozone Transport commission and the Ozone Transport Assessment Group.137
N.J.D.E.P. has focused on greenhouse gases, which contribute to global warm-
ing.  Of primary concern are carbon dioxide emissions, the biggest contributor of
all.138  In 1998, in a first-of-its-kind action, the State of New Jersey signed an
agreement with a foreign government, the Netherlands, to jointly work on global
tion” was regularly employed for bilateral agreements, it now is generally used for formal multi-
lateral treaties with a broad number of parties. Conventions are normally open for participation
by the international community as a whole, or by a large number of states. Usually the instru-
ments negotiated under the auspices of an international organization are entitled conventions
(e.g. Convention on Biological Diversity of 1992, United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 1982, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969). The same holds true for
instruments adopted by an organ of an international organization (e.g. the 1951 ILO Convention
concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value,
adopted by the International Labour Conference or the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the
Child, adopted by the General Assembly of the UN).
See Treaty Reference Guide, supra note 126.
131 See, Dernbach, supra note 20, at 904.
132 The often-cited Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice tells the International
Court of Justice that it shall consider three sources of international law in making its determinations:
customs, conventions, and general principles. Article 38 of the International Court of Justice, June
26,1945, Department of State publications 2349 and 2353, Conference Series 71 and 74, available at http
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm. See also Shinn, supra note
2, n. 3.
133 Shinn, supra note 2, at 93.
134 Id.
135 Donald Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: The Emergence of Global Environmental
Problems and the Critical Need to Develop Sustainable Development Programs at the State and Local
Levels in the United States, 5 DICK. J. ENV. L. POL. 175, 177 (Summer 1996).
136 Shinn, supra note 2, at 97.
137 Id.
138 Id.
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warming issues.139  In an effort to control global warming, the agreement identi-
fies strategies for developing pilot projects to trade carbon dioxide emission cred-
its internationally.140
Shinn and Polsky relay in their article that “part of the purpose for each party
[is] to gain experience in emissions trading for expanding use in the future if and
when global trading becomes a more commonplace means of addressing global
warming.”141  One such potential emission trade project involves the purchase by
the Netherlands of carbon dioxide credits from a United States electric utility
program which captures methane at a landfill in New Jersey.142  The methane
collection system that is employed by the electric utility program captures the
methane and uses it as an energy source.143  Prior to the collection systems im-
plementation, the methane gas was vented into the atmosphere and contributed to
global warming.144
The N.J.D.E.P in 2000 signed an international declaration involving other
states and nations, which committed the agency to reduce emissions with the idea
of increasing environmental and economic sustainability worldwide.145  This
declaration was called the International Declaration on Cleaner Production and
was sponsored by the United Nations’ Environmental Program (“U.N.E.P.”).146
Nearly forty countries and more than one thousand business entities have signed
the declaration.147
New Jersey and the Netherlands signed two agreements: Letter of Intent Be-
tween the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and The Environment, The
Netherlands and The Department of Environmental Protection, The State of New
Jersey (Letter of Intent) and Aide Memoire [Between] The Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection, The State of New Jersey and The Ministry of Housing,
Spatial Planning and the Environment, The Netherlands (Aide Memoire).148
Neither the Letter of Intent nor the Aide Memoire is binding on either signatory.
Although, the Commissioner for the Department of Environmental Protection (in
this case Robert C. Shinn, Jr.) does have the authority to bind New Jersey to
agreements.149
139 Id. at 99.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 96.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Letter of Intent Between the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and The Environment, The
Netherlands and The Department of Environmental Protection, The State of New Jersey, available at
http://www.state.nj.us/dep/dsr/Netherlands.PDF [Hereinafter Letter of Intent].
149 Telephone Interview with Marybeth Brenner, Director, Office of Constituent Relations & Cus-
tomer Service with the N.J.D.E.P. (April, 2004).
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As a general observation, the Letter of Intent is similar to the U.N.F.C.C.C. in
that it conveys an understanding as to what the goals are.150  Along the same
lines, the Aide Memoire, like the Kyoto Protocol, is more specific in its language
and provides the plan of action to accomplish those goals.151  Indeed, the Letter
of Intent makes multiple references to the U.N.F.C.C.C. and the Kyoto Protocol.
Item B references the preamble to the U.N.F.C.C.C. and “calls for the widest
possible cooperation by all countries and participation in an effective and appro-
priate international response” to climate change.152  Item D references Article 3,
paragraph 3 of the U.N.F.C.C.C. and mentions the policies and measures imple-
mented to address climate change should be cost effective and “. . .carried out
cooperatively by interested parties.”153  Item E references Article 4.2a of the
UNFCCC acknowledging awareness that the Annex I parties committed them-
selves to “adopt national policies” and take appropriate action to mitigate climate
changes which can be carried out through joint efforts.154  Item F references Arti-
cles 2, 3, & 4 of the Kyoto Protocol acknowledging awareness that parties should
cooperate with each other to promote sustainable development by sharing their
experience and exchanging information.155  Item G references Article 17 of the
Kyoto Protocol allowing participation in emissions trading to fulfill commit-
ments under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol.156  Finally, Item H referencing the
Kyoto Protocol expresses the need of the parties to gain practical experience in
emissions trading.157
The Aide Memoire follows the Letter of Intent and lays out a plan of action for
its implementation.158  Item C mentions a need for a standing committee to facili-
tate the exchange of information and experiences.159  This standing committee
was later created.160  Item G discusses implementing a pilot emissions trading
project.161  One trade did occur under this pilot emissions trading project.162
However, no further emissions trading have taken place due to administration
and policy changes in the Netherlands, New Jersey, and United States since im-
plementation of the Aide Memoire.163
New Jersey’s plan to promote the exchange of environmental technology and
information has expanded to include international agreements with Canada, Thai-
150 Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 124, at 46.
151 Id.
152 Letter of Intent, supra note 148.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Interview with Marybeth Brenner, supra note 149.
161 Letter of Intent, supra note 148.
162 Interview with Marybeth Brenner, supra note 149.
163 Id.
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land, Brazil, Germany, Israel, and France.164  Shinn and Polsky conclude that
“[s]tates should take the initiative in addressing global level problems that have
both an effect at the local level and for which effective local action can be
taken.”165  However, the forging of international agreements by states may be the
most effective means of addressing global environmental issues impacting states
today.166  Other states have since entered into discussions or agreements with
foreign nations, including a regional greenhouse gas reduction plan circulated
among the governors of New England states and the premiers of the provinces in
eastern Canada that will be international in scope once it is finalized.167
Conclusions
We have before us a problem of climate change that is certainly and measura-
bly already harmful to human life that yields long-term and deep changes to the
atmosphere.  All life depends upon it, therefore, this problem promises harm not
yet realized.  This is agreed by the world’s scientific community to be man-made.
Much debate has occurred and continues to occur as to what the United States
as a nation should do, can do and has done legally.  In the meantime, what else is
possible?  Operating under the principle “think globally; act locally” the nations
that signed the Climate Change Convention at Rio de Janeiro in 1992, agreed that
in addition to the international Agenda 21 plan for sustainability worldwide, it
was necessary for individual countries to adopt national Agenda 21, and depend-
ing upon the internal organization of the respective countries, they also agreed
that it was necessary for states, provinces, counties, boroughs, cities, parishes and
other forms of local municipal governments to adopt local Agenda 21 as well.168
Against this conceptual understanding of the problem of global warming and at
least one way forward, we have the notion of a sustainable plan for the twenty-
first century — one that balances environmental, social and economic needs of
the present without harming the needs of the future, where state and local initia-
tives are taken, and where state and local governments and citizens, who identify
themselves as members of these communities, act within those local governments
at some less-than-national level.
It is against the backdrop of this agenda and this manner of execution, that one
must consider legal problems such as the United States’ signing and ratification
of the U.N.F.C.C.C., its’ signing of the Kyoto Protocol but its refusal to ratify the
same.  In doing so, within the United States’ domestic law, even having taken
164 Shinn, supra note 2 at 99.
165 Id. at 103.
166 Id.
167 See Ken Colburn & Amy Royden, New England States and Eastern Canadian Provinces Team Up
to Tackle Climate Change, 2003 ABA SEC. ENV’T, ENERGY & RES. 7, available at http://abanet.org/
environ/committees/climatechange/newsletter/june03/newengland/home.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2004),
cited in Hodas, supra note 6, at 55.
168 United Nations Conference on Environment & Development, adopted Rio de Janeiro, June 14,
1992.
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this opportunity to explore new and conventional tools of analysis for state treaty
powers, one can never stray too far from the core issues concerning sovereignty.
These issues can be categorized by first asking what the general legal natures
of “supremacy” and “sovereignty” are within the meaning of the United States
Constitution.  Second, one must then apply those general categories to the
problems that arise in an actual situation as, for example, when New Jersey
wishes to enter into a binding agreement with the Netherlands (whether it is
called a “treaty” or not).  Third, one must determine what the supremacy of the
United States is when, for example a state wishes to enter into either non-treaty
trade agreements recognized officially and historically as exceptions to federal
supremacy, or other types of non-treaty agreements.  It is at this point that the
federal government’s express actions in law and policy not to adopt the Kyoto
Protocol, that is, its de-emption from the field, invites the states to make their
own attempts at dealing with climate changes by invitation and with legal
confidence.
Finally, however, one might find some insight into solutions by looking to
other federalist situations.  Agenda 21 and the principles contained therein sug-
gest that sustainability needs to be addressed locally—states are more local than
the federal government and in Europe, only when the federation is better suited is
it to carry out a law.  Second, the United States federal position has been to date
to be uninterested in executing the needed detail of the U.N.F.C.C.C., even if the
United States, as a federation, is better suited to carry out its agreed-upon duties
under the U.N.F.C.C.C. and Agenda 21.  Research could be advanced in alterna-
tive solutions by determining what preemptive effect a binding international
agreement between a state and a foreign government would have internationally
and domestically, if the federal government tried to re-enter the field and preempt
the state’s international agreement.  Finally, shared international and domestic
competence, in the form of an “open constitution,” wherein states openly con-
cede some of their sovereignty at the constitutional level, also dawns on the hori-
zon as a possible solution in addressing climate changes.169
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